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SUMMARY 
The Cooperative Research Centre (CRC) for Rail Innovation is conducting a tranche of industry-led research 
projects looking into safer rail level crossings. This paper will provide an overview of the Affordable Level 
Crossings project, a project that is performing research in both engineering and human factors aspects of 
low-cost level crossing warning devices (LCLCWDs), and is facilitating a comparative trial of these devices 
over a period of 12 months in several jurisdictions.  
Low-cost level crossing warning devices (LCLCWDs) are characterised by the use of alternative 
technologies for high cost components including train detection and connectivity (e.g. radar, acoustic, 
magnetic induction train detection systems and wireless connectivity replacing traditional track circuits and 
wiring). These devices often make use of solar power where mains power is not available, and aim to make 
substantial savings in lifecycle costs. 
The project involves trialling low-cost level crossing warning devices in shadow-mode, where devices are 
installed without the road-user interface at a number of existing level crossing sites that are already 
equipped with conventional active warning systems.  
It may be possible that the deployment of lower-cost devices can provide a significantly larger safety benefit 
over the network than a deployment of expensive conventional devices, as the lower cost would allow more 
passive level crossing sites to be upgraded with the same capital investment. 
The project will investigate reliability and safety integrity issues of the low-cost devices, as well as evaluate 
lifecycle costs and investigate human factors issues related to warning reliability. This paper will focus on the 
requirements and safety issues of LCLCWDs, and will provide an overview of the Rail CRC projects. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the 10-year period from 2000 to 2009, there 
have been 248 collisions and 35 fatalities at public 
level crossings with passive controls in Australia 
[1]. A stocktake undertaken by the Australian 
Railway Industry Standards and Safety Board 
(RISSB) in 2009 [2] indicates that there are 8,838 
public level crossings in Australia, of which 67% 
are protected with passive controls (i.e. stop or 
give-way signs). Although the risk at a single level 
crossing is relatively low, collectively level 
crossings with passive controls represent a 
significant safety concern for Australia, as there is 
the potential for collisions with high consequences.  
The cost of installing active protection at all of 
these crossings has been estimated by Cairney [3] 
in 2003 as being between $1.2 billion and $1.8 
billion, excluding maintenance and other lifecycle 
costs. The adoption of lower-cost solutions has 
therefore been a focus of Australian railways in 
recent years as a potential solution for improving 
safety at the multitude of level crossings with 
passive controls. 
Low-cost level crossing warning devices 
(LCLCWDs) are typically characterized by the use 
of alternative technologies for train detection, 
connectivity and power supply, with the objective 
of reducing equipment, installation, maintenance 
and operating costs. Installation costs of 
LCLCWDS are expected be less than 25% of the 
installation cost of conventional level crossing 
warning devices. 
This paper discusses challenges in the 
deployment of low-cost level crossings in a 
regional Australian context, opportunities for cost 
reduction based on the cost profile of conventional 
level crossings, safety of low-cost level crossings 
and the tranche of Rail CRC projects that are 
addressing these challenges. 
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1. Deployment of Low Cost Level Crossings 
in Regional Australian 
The majority of Australia’s public level crossings 
with passive controls (i.e. stop or give-way signs) 
are found in remote areas with low population 
density. The contexts of these level crossings 
range from seasonal lines (e.g. for transport of 
grain) and lines with low volumes of rail traffic (e.g. 
less than 1 service a week) to coal lines with 
frequent services.  
These contexts often bring with them a number of 
challenges: 
• Mains power is not always available. Solar 
power is a common alternative, however, 
driving boom gates with solar power may 
not always be achievable at a reasonable 
cost if there is insufficient solar yield.  
• Traditional track circuit based train 
detection can be unreliable in an 
environment where trains are infrequent. 
Prolonged or intermittent failures can 
occur due to oxidation of the rail surface. 
Even lightly rusted rails when dry can 
cause problems, especially when there are 
prolonged periods without trains [4]. Other 
environmental factors affecting track circuit 
integrity include leaf residue, oil film, coal 
dust, sand and crushed ballast [4]. Axle 
counters are often used instead of track 
circuits in these environments; however, 
axle counters can be damaged during 
maintenance activities [5]. There are also 
issues relating to reset and restoration 
procedures that need to be taken into 
account. 
• Harsh environmental conditions. Climatic 
conditions in Australia vary depending on 
region and proximity to the coast. 
Temperatures generally can range from 
−10°C to +55°C. In-land regions are 
characterized by high dust levels and low 
humidity, whereas coastal areas are 
exposed to high levels of salinity and 
possible cyclone conditions. Rainfall can 
vary significantly; however, it is not 
unusual to have several hundred 
millimetres of rainfall within a 24-hour 
period. 
• Remote locations can result in lengthy 
response and repair times. Remote 
monitoring can improve the response time 
for detectable failures and fault conditions, 
and is significantly more effective than 
relying solely on scheduled inspections by 
maintenance staff. It is expected that 
remote monitoring will be a key 
functionality of LCLCWDs. 
• GSM/GPRS coverage may be limited for 
remote monitoring. Where GSM in 
unavailable, there are alternatives 
including Iridium (satellite-based 
communications) that can be used to 
facilitate monitoring, albeit at a higher cost. 
 
The following key principles have been defined by 
the Rail CRC Affordable Level Crossing project 
team for the deployment and operation of 
LCLCWDs as a primary control on low-exposure 
level crossings: 
• LCLCWDs are not a replacement or 
substitute for existing high-integrity level 
crossing warning devices.  
• LCLCWDs are intended for deployment at 
low exposure level crossings with passive 
controls (e.g. single track lines with little or 
no passenger traffic, low train volumes 
and low road vehicle volumes). It is also 
assumed that single bi-directional track is 
not within 25 seconds of duplicated track. 
Level crossings with a siding are excluded 
on the basis that a different methodology 
for activating protection is likely to be 
required. 
• Definition of exposure should be based on 
risk evaluation. This principle should be 
consistent nationally, however, individual 
accredited railway operators (AROs) can 
make the decision to define more stringent 
requirements (e.g. no passenger trains, 
reduced speed). 
• The interface to the road user is the RX5 
flashing light assembly (AS1742.7 [6]), 
such that there are no expected regulatory 
changes to road rules. This does not, 
however, preclude the use of other road 
user interfaces at a later stage should 
there be evidence in support of a different 
interface. The residual risk associated with 
a potential failure must be mitigated by 
other controls on the hierarchy. Such 
controls include educating motorists of the 
system of interventions used; their effect 
and limitations; signage warning motorists 
of the potential for failure; and additional 
passive interventions. 
• The safety integrity of LCLCWDs should 
be at least commensurate with risk at low 
exposure crossings. 
• The installation and lifecycle costs of 
LCLCWDs must be sufficiently low to 
demonstrate a benefit-cost ratio better 
than that of conventional systems for 
treatment of a population of low-exposure 
level crossings with passive controls for a 
given investment. The Rail Safety Act 
requires AROs to eliminate risks, and 
where this is not practicable, to reduce 
those risks so far as is reasonably 
practicable. In determining what is 
reasonably practicable, the benefit of risk 
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reduction including societal benefits such 
as mitigated safety loss are weighed 
against the cost of implementing the 
control. 
Regarding Australian rail safety legislation, on the 
4th November 2011 Australia’s transport ministers 
approved the new Rail Safety National Law [7], 
which will commence in 2013. The Law replaces 
existing state and territory rail safety legislative 
schemes with a national scheme and will establish 
a single rail safety regulator. Australian states 
have also recently made the transition to the 
model Work Health and Safety Bill 2011 [8], 
harmonising health and safety laws across 
Australia. The new Rail Safety National Law 
explains the relationship and its operation with the 
OHS legislation and circumstances in which both 
apply. 
 
2. Opportunities for Cost Reduction 
Equipment costs have often been the sole focus of 
efforts to develop a low-cost level crossing 
solution. While equipment cost is important, it 
represents a relatively small portion of installation 
and lifecycle costs. 
Hellman and daSIilva [9] summarize an analysis of 
baseline grade crossing system costs published by 
the American Railway Engineering and 
Maintenance-of-Way Association (AREMA). 
Approximately 49% of the estimated costs are 
related to equipment. The remaining 51% are 
related to installation, engineering and site survey, 
ground materials and freight. Other than reducing 
equipment costs, there is significant opportunity for 
cost reduction in the installation and 
commissioning activities that can be facilitated 
through alternative design or streamlining of 
existing processes. The following subsections 
detail opportunities for cost reduction in 
installation, operation and maintenance of the 
product.  
 
2.1. Installation costs 
Wayth [10] provides a cost analysis for 
implementation of level crossings with boom 
barriers in Victoria, identifying options for cost 
reduction. Table 1 summarizes the items where 
cost reduction can be influenced by the design of 
the LCLCWD. 
 
 Conventional LX 
costs 
Opportunity for 
cost reduction 
Energy supply Provision of mains 
power (including 
trenching) 
Use of solar power 
Component 
connectivity 
Trenching for 
cable runs 
Use of wireless 
communications 
Train detection Track 
improvement work 
for track circuits 
and grade 
crossing predictors 
(e.g. head 
bonding, ballast 
cleaning, provision 
of insulating rail 
joints, etc.);  
Use of alternative 
train detection 
systems not 
requiring track 
work 
Table 1. Installation costs 
 
Track circuits and grade crossing predictors are 
among train detection technologies commonly 
used in conventional level crossing in Australia. 
Both these technologies require track work, 
significantly increasing the cost of installation. 
Reliability of train detection is a key issue and one 
of the potential causes of a wrong-side failure of a 
level crossing, i.e. if a train detection system fails 
to detect an approaching train (failure to shunt).  
Train detection technologies dependant on wheel 
to rail conductivity are notoriously unreliable after 
lengthy periods with no rail traffic. Conventional 
approaches in this context may prove to be costly 
with re-commissioning costs and high levels of 
maintenance required to ensure reliable train 
detection. Poor shunting conditions also affect 
grade crossing predictors, potentially resulting in 
reduced warning times [11].  
The motivation behind the use of alternative train 
detection technologies is not only to reduce the 
equipment and installation costs, but also to 
ensure maintenance and other lifecycle costs are 
lower than their conventional counterparts.  
Alternatives to wheel to rail conductivity based 
train detection include axle counters, which are 
already type approved and used in many 
Australian railways.  
In an attempt to further reduce costs, several low 
cost train detection technologies have emerged in 
trials and products around the world. A non-
exhaustive list of technologies is provided below. 
Note that reliability issues appear to be a 
significant stumbling block for many of these.  
• Radar;  
• Acoustic sensors; 
• Magnetic anomaly; 
• Magnetic induction; and 
• GPS activation. 
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A number of emerging LCLCWDs are based on 
technologies such as radar and have been 
designed to operate and detect trains from outside 
of the danger zone (i.e. the train detector is not 
installed within 3 meters of the danger zone). 
Installation costs related to safeworking can 
therefore be significantly reduced, resulting in a 
lower installation cost. 
Other costs such as design, drafting, testing and 
commissioning work can potentially be streamlined 
for a cross-section of level crossings that are 
similar in terms of exposure, sighting distance, etc. 
This is what is commonly termed as the “crossing 
in a box” concept. These efficiencies, however, 
can be best achieved by railway companies. 
2.2. Operational costs 
LCLCWD design can also influence operational 
costs as illustrated in the items detailed in Table 2. 
Note that some operational costs such as 
communication for remote monitoring are 
expected to be at least equivalent to that of 
conventional level crossings, if not more costly due 
to GSM coverage issues in some areas.  
 
 Conventional LX 
costs 
Opportunity for 
cost reduction 
Train detection On seasonal lines 
with train detection 
dependant on 
wheel to rail 
conductivity, re-
commissioning is 
required after 
extended periods 
without trains  
Use of alternate 
train detection 
systems that 
reliably detect 
trains after 
significant periods 
of inactivity  
Power supply Mains power 
supply (supply 
costs) 
User of solar 
power 
   
Table 2. Operational costs 
 
2.3. Maintenance and other lifecycle costs 
The design of a LCLCWD can strongly influence 
the total cost of ownership. For example, 
components that do not require continuous 
adjustment or maintenance and have a modular 
design facilitating a short time to repair are likely to 
provide significant savings over the lifetime of the 
warning device. Remote monitoring and the 
provisioning of on-site diagnostic tools can also 
significantly improve time to repair, and hence 
costs over the lifetime of the device. 
Costs related to safeworking for maintenance can 
also be reduced if level crossing equipment that 
requires regular maintenance is installed 3 meters 
from the rail corridor.  
Lifecycle evaluation criteria are being developed 
as part of the Rail CRC Affordable level crossing 
project to provide a basis for comparison of 
warning devices, which otherwise would be difficult 
to evaluate. 
 
3. Safety of Low Cost Level Crossings 
One of the key challenges for developers of 
LCLCWDs is to reduce costs whilst maintaining a 
high level of safety integrity. 
The use of alternative power supplies, connectivity 
and train detection systems to reduce costs and 
provide suitable train detection for the harsh 
environment in regional areas of Australia, can 
potentially result in increased complexity and 
present challenges to meeting safety targets (i.e. 
tolerable hazard rates). Section 3.2 provides 
examples of this and argues why it might be 
necessary to lower requirements of safety 
integrity.  
Two of the safety principles stated earlier in the 
paper are (1) that the safety integrity of LCLCWDs 
should be at least commensurate with the risk at 
low exposure crossings; and (2) that the interface 
to the road user should be the RX5 flashing light 
assembly as defined in AS1742.7 [6]. 
By requiring LCLCWDs to have the same road 
user interface as conventional level crossing 
warning devices, the fundamental difference 
between low-cost and conventional systems is 
constrained to train detection, control of the 
warning (i.e. level crossing logic controller) and the 
energy supply system.  
Level crossings are not in themselves fail-safe, as 
they rely on procedures to mitigate risks of failure. 
While individual components can be designed with 
a high level of safety integrity and reliability, the 
failure of the primary power supply requires human 
intervention for both detection of the condition and 
remediation. Otherwise, if the primary power 
supply fails, it is inevitable that the battery backup 
with eventually be exhausted and the crossing will 
fail wrong-side.  
Remote monitoring of the crossing and time to 
repair are therefore critical in ensuring safety of 
the level crossing, especially for level crossings in 
remote areas of Australia.  
The following subsections discuss one of the 
common processes for satisfying safety 
requirements and the impact cost reduction is 
likely to have on safety. 
 
3.1. Demonstrating safety targets have been 
met – a high level overview  
The following overview is based on the CENELEC 
railway standards EN50126 [12], EN50128 [13] 
and EN50129 [14]. 
Suppliers of LCLCWDs as part of an approval 
process would typically be required to provide a 
safety case containing evidence of quality 
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management, safety management and functional 
and technical safety appropriate to the function of 
the LCLCWD. 
Safety management evidence involves 
demonstrating compliance with all the elements of 
the safety management processes defined 
EN50126 [12]. 
A technical safety report (demonstrating functional 
and technical safety) provides evidence of safety 
analyses, design principles and technical 
principles that assure the safety of the design. The 
report should provide sections including assurance 
of correct functional operation; effects of faults; 
operation with external influences; safety-related 
application conditions and safety qualification 
tests. 
As new and alternative level crossing warning 
devices are typically comprised of programmable 
electronic devices (i.e. programmable logic 
controllers), safety process evidence becomes 
more important in providing assurance systematic 
failures have been adequately addressed. 
IEC61508 [15] is an international standard for 
functional safety of electronic and programmable 
electronic safety related systems. Railway specific 
versions of this standard have been developed in 
CENELEC EN50128 [13] and EN50129 [14]. 
EN50129 [14] describes the process of safety 
acceptance and approval; and provides an annex 
describing the derivation, allocation and 
implementation of safety requirements for safety-
related systems for railway application consistent 
with IEC61508 [15]. 
According to the processes defined in this 
document, railways would typically be responsible 
for the following activities: 
• Definition of the system in a generic, 
technology independent way; 
• Identification of hazards relevant to the 
system and estimation of hazard rates; 
• Analysis of potential consequences; and  
• Definition of risk tolerability criteria and 
tolerable hazard rates (THR) for identified 
hazards by estimating the resulting 
individual risk or deriving THRs from a 
comparison with the performance of 
existing systems using statistical or 
analytical methods.  
A supplier of a level crossing warning device 
would be typically required to demonstrate that 
hazards have been adequately controlled and that 
the device meets the associated safety targets for 
each of the hazards.  
Two types of failure integrity need to be 
considered in demonstrating that safety targets are 
met: random failure (i.e. failures due to physical 
causes and a variety of degradation mechanisms) 
and systematic failure (i.e. failures due to flaws in 
the system, where systems fail consistently when 
subjected to the same conditions). The THR is 
used to justify systematic and random failure 
integrity requirements. 
Assuming the railway has defined THRs, Safety 
Integrity Levels (SILs) can be allocated to sub-
systems based on the THRs.  
SILs are specified as one of four discrete levels, 
where the apportioned THR per hour falls within a 
range associated with a given level. While random 
failures can be quantified using probabilistic 
calculations, this is not possible for systematic 
failures, and therefore each safety integrity level is 
associated with a group of methods and tools used 
to provide the stated level of confidence [14]. 
The supplier would further apportion the failure 
rates and allocate SILs to equipment in the sub-
systems implementing the safety function(s). 
Typical methods for facilitating apportionment 
include reliability block diagrams, fault trees, etc. 
Refer to CENELEC railway standards EN50126 
[12], EN50128 [13] and EN50129 [14] for more 
details on the above process and supporting 
methods. 
 
3.2. Impact of cost reduction on safety 
This section illustrates the impact cost reduction 
measures discussed in Section 2 can have on 
meeting safety targets. A non-exhaustive list of 
hazards identified with respect to the safety 
function “to provide timely warning of an 
approaching train” is detailed below: 
• Warning not given for approaching train; 
• Warning given with incorrect time delay for 
approaching train; 
• Warning extinguished before train has left 
crossing; 
• Warning not extinguished when train has 
left crossing; and 
• Warning not extinguished with correct time 
delay when train has left crossing. 
 
In the following example, the hazard “warning not 
given for approaching train” is used. 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 are high-level fault-trees 
illustrating the difference between a flashing-lights-
only conventional track-circuit based level crossing 
warning device and a LCLCWD with wireless 
communications and multiple power supplies.  
The fault-trees illustrate that the cost-saving 
wireless communications has added significant 
complexity to the system and has resulted in more 
components that can contribute to the top-level 
dangerous failure rate. This could potentially result 
in equipment costs increasing substantially with 
respect to the conventional equipment in order to 
meet the THR.  
Christian Wullems  Low Cost Level Crossings 
CRC for Rail Innovation   
  Conference On Railway Engineering 
  Brisbane 10 – 12 September 2012  
 
No warning given 
for approaching 
train
Failure of road 
signals Failure of PLC
Track circuit 
failure
LXRSIGFAIL
Failure of power 
supply
PWRFAIL PLCFAIL TCFAIL
WARNFAIL
 
 
Figure 1. Fault tree – conventional 
 
 
No warning given 
for approaching 
train
Failure of wireless 
communications
Failure of road 
signals
Failure of PLC
Failure in logic 
controller
Failure to detect 
train on approach
Failure of power 
supply
Failure of strike-in 
axle counter
Failure of wireless 
communications
PWRFAIL WCOMFAIL
LXRSIGFAIL
Failure of power 
supply
PWRFAIL
WCOMFAIL
PLCFAIL
AXCFAIL
LXLCFAIL TDSFAIL
WARNFAIL
 
 
Figure 2. Fault tree for alternative (axle counter 
with wireless) 
 
Given that one of the key principles for the 
adoption of LCLCWDs is that safety integrity is at 
least commensurate to the risk at low exposure 
crossings, a case could be made for reducing the 
THRs for a specific cross-section of low-exposure 
level crossings. This is perhaps the most 
significant hurdle in progressing the argument for 
support of LCLCWDs.  
The Rail CRC Affordable Level Crossings project 
is conducting a risk assessment to determine 
whether hazard rates lower than the current 
performance of conventional level crossing 
warning devices are tolerable at low exposure 
level crossings. The risk assessment also aims to 
determine whether LCLCWDs that meet the lower 
THRs can collectively provide a better safety 
benefit for treatment of a population of level 
crossings than conventional warning devices for 
the same budget. 
The lower safety requirements also have legal 
implications for the railway, including issues of Tort 
liability and compliance with the Rail Safety Act. 
Section 4.2 discusses the strategy for addressing 
these issues as part of the Rail CRC’s tranche of 
projects investigating safer level crossings. 
 
4. Rail CRC Projects 
4.1. The affordable level crossings project 
The CRC for Rail Innovation’s Affordable Level 
Crossing project aims to facilitate a field trial of 
candidate LCLCWDs at several high-exposure and 
low-exposure sites. While this process is not a 
type approval, it is expected to collect data in a 
wide range of operating and environmental 
conditions over a period of 12 months, providing 
confidence that the candidate LCLCWDs are 
capable of performing as intended in the target 
contexts.  
The trial will be conducted in shadow-mode, where 
systems to be tested will be installed in parallel to 
existing vital track circuits. The warning interfaces 
of the systems being tested will not be provided to 
road users. The trial aims to log data from both the 
vital systems and candidate LCLCWDs, facilitating 
the collection of comparative performance data 
without affecting the safety of the rail level 
crossing or vital signaling at trial sites.  
In addition to the trial, the project is developing 
lifecycle evaluation criteria to support the selection 
of candidate systems, and the development of a 
risk assessment in support for lower safety targets. 
Human factors issues related to failure of warnings 
at level crossings are also being investigated. The 
human factors research is investigating the effect 
of frequent and prolonged right-side failure on road 
user behaviour. It is expected that this research 
will inform reliability targets for LCLCWDs.  
Gildersleeve and Wullems [16] discuss the human 
factors issues in more depth and outline the 
human factors research being conducted as part 
of the Rail CRC Affordable Level Crossings 
project.  
 
4.2. Rail level crossing intervention framework 
project 
The CRC for Rail Innovation’s Level Crossing 
Intervention Framework project aims to progress 
the underlying argument for LCLCWDs with lower 
safety targets for a cross-section of low-exposure 
crossings.  
The project involves the development of a position 
paper based on the risk assessment developed in 
the Affordable Level Crossings project. It is 
anticipated that the position paper and supporting 
arguments will be used to facilitate a stakeholder 
review and to seek independent advice and review 
from economists, legal experts and risk experts. 
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The legal advice is expected to explore whether 
the deployment of LCLCWDs on this basis follows 
the intent of the Rail Safety Act and the obligation 
of the AROs to reduce risk so far as is reasonably 
practicable (SFAIRP). Advice on the Tort liability 
issue will also be sought, addressing concerns 
where a collision occurs at level crossing with a 
LCLCWD, and it is found that the same collision 
would not have occurred with a conventional 
warning device. 
Should there be a satisfactory outcome from the 
reviews and advice, it is anticipated that a 
decision-making framework will be developed with 
a series of detailed case studies to support the 
decision making process. 
The CRC for Rail Innovation does not advocate 
the use of less than fail-safe interventions in a 
manner inconsistent with the duty of care 
obligations. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has presented a discussion of issues 
relating to the deployment low-cost level crossing 
warning devices (LCLCWDs) in regional Australia. 
The paper described the deployment context and 
identified challenges relating to harsh Australian 
conditions and reliability of train detection on 
seasonal lines.  
Opportunities for cost reduction influenced by the 
design of LCLCWDs were presented, and a high-
level overview of the process for demonstrating 
functional and technical safety was given. This set 
the scene for a discussion on the impact of cost 
reduction on safety and the possibility of reduced 
safety targets for LCLCWDs. 
The paper concluded with an overview of the Rail 
CRC projects that are addressing the issues 
discussed in this paper.  
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